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This paper presents evidence on the impact of managers on cost efficiency in 
banking. Stochastic frontier analysis is applied to a unique Finnish data set. The 
paper finds that manager age and education have strong yet complicated effects. 
University education enhances efficiency if the manager is running a large bank. 
Managing director changes are systematically followed by efficiency changes. 
Manager retirement typically causes an efficiency improvement, whereas other 
manager changes can either improve or weaken efficiency. 
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Johtajat ja tehokkuus pankkitoiminnassa 
Suomen Pankin keskustelualoitteita 11/2007 
Karlo Kauko 




Tässä keskustelualoitteessa tarkastellaan johtajien vaikutuksia pankkien kus-
tannustehokkuuteen. Työssä sovelletaan satunnaisen rintaman estimointia ainut-
laatuiseen suomalaisista pankeista koostuvaan aineistoon. Toimitusjohtajan iällä 
ja koulutuksella on voimakkaita, joskin monimutkaisia vaikutuksia. Yliopisto-
koulutus edistää tehokkuutta, jos johtaja on vastuussa suuresta pankista. Johtajan 
vaihtumista yleensä seuraa tehokkuuden muutos. Eläkkeelle jääminen useimmiten 
aiheuttaa tehokkuuden kasvun, kun taas muut johtajanvaihdokset voivat joko 
heikentää tai parantaa tehokkuutta. 
 
Avainsanat: tehokkuus, pankkitoiminta, johtajat 
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Bank efficiency studies have become an established field of empirical economics. 
These studies have developed a relatively standardised methodology and 
conceptual framework. A central term in this literature is ‘managerial efficiency’, 
which simply refers to the ability of a bank to maximise profits or minimise costs 
under given circumstances. This expression attributes efficiency to managers. 
Paradoxically, there seem to be almost no empirical studies on the relevance of 
managers to managerial efficiency in banking. 
  This paper is an attempt to shed some light on this issue. Following Fries and 
Taci (2005), Sensarma (2006) and Kraft, Hofler and Payne (2006), the stochastic 
frontier analysis (SFA) method of Battese and Coelli (1995) is used to derive cost 
efficiency estimates. Bank output is defined according to the production approach. 
A unique, detailed balanced panel data set on Finnish cooperative and savings 
banks is used. The data set is very well suited for analysing this question because 
it includes systematically collected and detailed personal information on hundreds 
of bank managers; few data sets of this kind are available. 
  It is found that age and education affect performance in cost minimisation, but 
these effects seem to be rather complicated. University graduates have a 
comparative advantage in running relatively large banks. Managers with 
university degrees in business administration or economics seem to outperform 
their colleagues with a university degree in law or agriculture and forestry. 
Vocational level qualification in business administration seems to be an excellent 
educational background in very small banks. Among young managers efficiency 
improves as a function of age but among the oldest efficiency deteriorates. 
Manager changes are systematically followed by above average changes in 
efficiency. If an old manager retires, a significant cost efficiency improvement 
typically follows. In other cases efficiency is affected, but there is no regularity in 
the direction of change. 
  Previous literature is reviewed in section 2. Section 3 describes the data. The 
method and the specification are presented in section 4. Empirical results are 




Efficiency has different established definitions in previous literature. The most 
common of them seems to be cost efficiency, which simply refers to the ability of 
the bank to avoid unnecessary costs, when input prices and the quantity and 
composition of output are given. This efficiency concept has often been used as  
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the only definition.
1 The two profit efficiency concepts refer to the ability to 
maximise profits under prevailing circumstances; they are normally used 
simultaneously with the cost efficiency concept.
2 
  In most efficiency analyses the logarithmic objective is regressed on variables 
that would affect the value of the objective function in the case of a fully efficient 
institution; for instance, logarithmic costs are normally regressed on different 
transformations and interactions of input prices, output quantities and possible 
other variables. OLS analysis is seldom used in bank efficiency studies. Stochastic 
frontier analysis (SFA) is one of the most popular methods. SFA decomposes the 
error term into the expected value of inefficiency and random variation, such as 
measurement error. The random error may be either positive or negative. In cost 
functions the inefficiency term is always positive because it increases costs. The 
cost function of a completely efficient institution in absence of random factors is 
called the efficient frontier. 
  Many studies on the determinants of efficiency use a two-stage approach. 
First, efficiency scores for individual banks are estimated by using the SFA. As a 
second step the statistical interrelationship between efficiency and its potential 
determinants is analysed using other statistical methods.
3 This approach, however, 
may lead to biased results, especially if the determinants of efficiency correlate 
with variables included in the cost function. The Battese-Coelli (1995) method 
does not suffer from this problem. The impact of inefficiency determinants is 
estimated simultaneously with the efficient frontier itself by using an iterative 
maximum likelihood procedure. Each observation of the sample is assigned an 
inefficiency estimate that partly depends on these determinants. In recent years the 
method has been gaining ground in bank efficiency literature. Three recent papers 
have used its presumably superior ability to provide estimates on the impact of 
different factors on banks’ cost efficiency; Fries and Taci (2005) analysed banks 
from various transition countries, Sensarma (2006) the Indian banking sector and 
Kraft, Hofler and Payne (2006) Croatian banks. These papers largely concentrated 
on the impact of ownership. Williams and Nguyen (2005) used the method in their 
analysis on profit efficiency and bank governance in South East Asia. 
  As to measuring output, banking may be one of the most difficult industries. 
The production approach assumes that the bank produces certain financial 
services, such as loans, deposits and payment intermediation. The choice of 
services included in the output vector is often based on subjective discretion. It 
has been commonplace to use the number of accounts and loans as output 
                                                 
1 Pi and Timme (1993), Weill (2004), Rezvanian and Mehdian (2002), Humphrey and Vale 
(2004), Prior (2003), Dietsch and Lozano-Vivas (2000), Fries and Taci (2005), Matoušek and Taci 
(2004), Sensarma (2006), Esho (2001), Girardone, Molyneyx and Gardener (2004), Kraft, Hofler 
and Payne (2006), to mention a few. 
2 See eg Berger and Mester (1997), Altunbas, Evans and Molyneux (2001), Koetter (2006). 
3 See eg Bonin, Hasan and Wachtel (2005), Bos and Kool (2006), Clark and Siems (2002), Kwan 
(2006), Carbo, Gardener and Williams (2002), Girardone, Molyneux and Gardener (2004).  
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indicators, but it is equally possible to use balance sheet data. Bank costs are 
defined as personnel and other operational costs. Interest expenditure is ignored. 
This approach used to be very commonplace.
4 Its popularity seems to have 
declined, but in recent years it has been used by at least Prior (2003). The 
intermediation approach considers deposits as inputs and includes interest 
expenditure in costs. The value-added approach considers deposits simultaneously 
an output and an input; interest expenditure is included in costs but the quantity of 
deposits is included in the output vector. 
  Input prices are essential to efficiency estimations. Traditionally, it has been 
commonplace to calculate the price of inputs at the bank level. For instance, the 
price of labour has been calculated by dividing staff costs by the number of 
employees. However, in a perfectly competitive market all banks should face 
identical factor prices. If the market is not perfectly competitive, factor prices 
should be endogenous. Mountain and Thomas (1999) may have been the first to 
discuss these issues in detail. One method to avoid the problem is to calculate 
averages for each geographic area and to use the average for all the banks of the 
region. This method has been used by at least Koetter (2006) and Bos and Kool 
(2006). According to Koetter (2006), the problems of bank specific input price 
proxies are particularly accentuated in cost function estimations. 
  There are a few person related factors that can be measured in an objective 
way. The most obvious of them is education. The human capital theory pioneered 
by Becker (1962) assumes that education creates valuable human capital. The 
signalling theory, largely due to Spence (1973), assumes that skilled individuals 
acquire education to signal their type. Both theories suggest that education should 
correlate with efficiency. Testing the theories against each other is difficult 
because they both yield rather similar empirical predictions. Riley (2001) reviews 
the empirical evidence and the findings seem to be conflicting. 
 Perhaps  surprisingly,  there seem to be very little econometric research on the 
impact of manager characteristics on bank performance. However, CEO 
shareholdings weaken cost efficiency among US banks (Pi and Timme, 1993). 
Branch manager turnover correlates with bad loans, presumably because local 
management gradually accumulates tacit knowledge on local borrowers (Ferri, 
1997). As to non-bank financial institutions, the impact of fund manager 
educational background on the performance of a securities portfolio has been 
analysed (Gottesman and Morey, 2006, Chevalier and Ellison, 1999). 
  Cooperative banks may have an informational advantage over limited liability 
banks because members of credit cooperatives normally live in the same 
community, and they are often engaged in similar activities. If default by one 
debtor causes losses to peers, borrowers would monitor each other in joint-
liability arrangements (Ghatak, 2000). Alternatively non-borrower members may 
                                                 
4 See the appendix 1 of the review article of Clark (1988).  
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monitor debtors (Banerjee, Besley and Guinnane, 1994). Australian credit 
cooperatives seem to pass on the benefits of cost efficiency to members by 
lowering their interest rate spreads (Esho, 2001). 
 
 
3 The  data 
The data set contains information on 309 Finnish savings and cooperative banks 
for which data are available for the years 1999–2004; the balanced sample 
consists of 1854 observations. These banks are small by any standards, which is 
no problem. In a very small organisation every employee may report directly to 
the managing director, making managerial skills easier to detect than in large 
organisations. Almost all these banks have branches in one geographic region 
only. Accounting data are from a confidential Financial Supervision Authority 
(FSA) supervisory database, and they are more detailed than information found in 
public sources. 
  The banks can be divided into three different groups. The largest of them 
consists of 230 member banks of the consortium of cooperative banks.
5 These 
banks operate in close cooperation and they are even responsible for each others’ 
debts. The second largest group consists of 42 local cooperative banks. These 
banks also cooperate, although without mutual responsibility for each others’ 
commitments. The third group of banks consists of 37 savings banks. Two of 
these three groups are denoted with dummy variables (Group1, Group2); because 
of data confidentiality the identity of these groups cannot be disclosed. 
  Data on banks’ managing directors are also from a confidential FSA database. 
The data contain the name and the date of birth of former and current board 
members and managing directors of all the supervised entities. Precise dates when 
the person assumed the position and when the tenure ended are also recorded. 
These data are complete. Moreover, the database contains information on 
managers’ education, but unfortunately in about 36% of cases this information is 
missing. In the following analyses, managers’ education is characterised by the 
following six dummy variables; UAgSil  =  +1 if the manager has a university 
degree in agriculture and/or silviculture, zero otherwise; UBusEcon = university 
degree in business administration, economics or finance, ULaw = university 
degree in law, UOther = university degree in other disciplines (typically in social 
sciences), VocBus = vocational qualification in business administration, Other = 
other non-university education (typically in agriculture). 
  Managers whose education is not reported are typically in charge of relatively 
small institutions. The median real Tier1 capital in millions of 2004 euros is 5.0 
                                                 
5 This group is sometimes called the OP bank group or Okobank group, even though strictly 
speaking Okobank is a commercial bank largely owned by other members of the consortium.  
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for banks whose manager’s education is not reported, 4.1 for banks with a 
managing director without university degree and 8.4 for banks whose managers 
have university degrees. This may imply that relatively many managers whose 
education is not reported have no university degrees. 
 
Table 3.1  The proportion of different educational 
      achievements in the sample; the average age of 
      managers according to education 
 
  UAgSil UBusEcon Ulaw  Uother  VocBus Other  Missing
Share in 1999  4.5%  12.0%  11.7%  4.2%  20.1%  10.0%  37.5% 
Share in 2004  5.5%  12.3%  12.6%  5.2%  18.8%  10.0%  35.6% 
Average age in 1999  45  46  45  47  49  52  49 
Average age in 2004  48  49  48  49  52  53  51 
 
 
Three manager tenure length dummies are defined. Less2y equals +1 if the 
manager has held the position for less than two years as of 1
st of January. Less5y 
equals +1 if the manager has held the position for at least two but less than five 
years. Over15y denotes cases where the manager has held the position for more 
than 15 years. 
  The production approach is used to define bank output. The intermediation 
approach and the value added approach consider interest expenditure an ordinary 
cost, which would not be a meaningful assumption in the case of these banks. At 
least savings banks should have no reason to avoid paying high deposit rates 
whenever they can afford it. The Savings Bank Act stipulates that the objective of 
these institutions is to promote saving. With the exception of limited liability 
savings banks not included in the sample, these institutions have no owners in the 
traditional meaning of the word. They do not normally distribute profits. The 
managing director is chosen by the board, which is nominated by the trustees of 
the savings bank. The trustees are elected either directly or indirectly by 
depositors. Hence, managers’ principals represent depositors. Depositor wealth 
maximisation requires minimisation of administrative expenses but is normally 
inconsistent with profit maximisation. 
  As to cooperative banks, the situation is somewhat similar. Each member of a 
cooperative bank has one vote in the members’ meeting, which is the highest 
decision making body of the institution. This meeting chooses the supervisory 
board, which chooses the managing director. Members can benefit from their 
bank in two different ways. Firstly, cooperative banks can offer fee discounts to 
their members. Secondly, members often receive a kind of dividend payout. Thus, 
a well governed cooperative bank has a multi-variable objective function 
consisting of both profits and members’ possibilities to use advantageous services. 
The explicit payout to members is taxable whereas discounts on financial services  
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are not, making direct profit sharing less attractive. Offering discount prices is 
often inconsistent with profit maximisation, but cost efficiency helps to offer 
attractive fees. 
  Banks are assumed to have four outputs, namely transaction account deposits, 
other deposits, housing loans and other claims on the public and public sector 
entities. Transaction accounts may be a satisfactory proxy for the amount of 
payment services provided to customers. Housing loans are defined as loans 
secured by mortgages on residential property in the Basel I system. Other loans 
are calculated by subtracting housing loans from claims on the public and public 
sector entities. Each balance sheet item is calculated as the average of four 
quarterly observations of the year. Variables are made real by dividing them by 
the wholesale price index. 
 
Table 3.2  Distribution of variables; thousands of real 2004 
      euros; 6*309 = 1854 observations 
 





Loans excl housing loans 4 779 9 708 16 282 29 466 56 923
Housing loans 4 089 7 343 13 548 29 344 76 305
Demand deposits 4 221 8 604 17 983 40 320 83 840
Other deposits 3 928 7 625 16 187 30 567 59 192
Tier 1 capital 1 735 2 927 5 227 9 331 18 172
Costs 308 502 822 1 504 3 314
Age of the manag dir 39 44 50 55 58 
 
 
Because exogenous input prices are preferable to bank-specific estimates in cost 
efficiency estimations (Mountain and Thomas, 1999, Koetter, 2006), input prices 
are assumed to be equal for all banks in the same region. Unlike in many previous 
contributions, input prices are from general statistical sources. Labour costs are 
based on the wage index of financial sector employees. This index is adjusted by 
taking into account the mandatory pension insurance fee. The average annual 
increase of nominal labour price during the observation period was 4.4%. The 
GDP deflator of the sector ‘services to the business sector and real estate’ is the 
second input price; it includes services related to IT, marketing, legal issues, real 
estate, human resources management, security etc. The average annual increase of 
this price index was 4.7%. 
  Bank costs are measured by the profit and loss account item ‘administrative 
expenses’. This cost item contains personnel costs, ICT costs, marketing 
expenditure, office supplies etc. This concept does not include ‘other operating 
expenses’, which mainly consists of real estate costs and statutory fees, such as 
contributions to the deposit insurance fund and supervision fees charged by the  
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FSA. These statutory fees are not particularly relevant to cost efficiency because 
they could not be legally avoided without suspending operations. It may be more 
problematic to exclude real estate costs. Including them would also be 
problematic because buildings are both an input and an output. Small Finnish 
banks often use rental real estate, mainly business property, as an investment 
asset. In the light of book values, about 47% of sample banks’ real estate was not 
used by the banks themselves. Data on rental income is available, but it is difficult 
to calculate the bank specific quantity of real estate ‘output’ because rents differ 
substantially between towns and no regional rental market data is available. Real 
estate is not necessarily marked to the market. It is probably consistent to ignore 
real estate both as an output and as an input. The bias in costs may not be 
particularly dangerous because the sum of other operating expenses and 
depreciation on buildings is less than one third of administrative expenses. 
Moreover, administrative expenses probably make a satisfactory proxy for other 
operating expenses. At the bank level the correlation between administrative 
expenses and other operating expenses was +0.96 in 2004, if one does not control 
for bank size. 
  Geographic factors are controlled for by ten dummy variables. Nine dummy 
variables denote the first digit of the postal code. Each of these variables refers to 
a relatively cohesive geographic area. Areas close to the capital with postal codes 
beginning with 0 remain the reference case. Factor prices may differ between 
urban and other areas; the dummy variable URBAN denotes banks headquartered 
in urban municipalities with more than 50 000 inhabitants. 
 
Table 3.3  Geographic distribution of sample banks 
 
Region Non-urban Urban  Banks in total
01 1 0 1 1
12 3 0 2 3
24 5 2 4 7
35 3 1 5 4
41 6 2 1 8
51 9 2 2 1
64 8 1 4 9
72 7 1 2 8
83 4 1 3 5
92 1 2 2 3
Whole country 297 12 309 
 
 
The size of the bank is used as a potential determinant of efficiency. The balance 
sheet total would probably be a problematic size indicator because it is highly 
endogenous and largely determined by items classified as outputs, by either the  
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supply of deposits or the demand for loans. The tier 1 capital is less endogenous. 
At least in the case of lending, it is an essential determinant of capacity. 
 
 
4 The  model 
Unlike many previous contributions, this paper does not analyse commercial 
banks. It is far from obvious that savings banks and cooperative banks would 
maximise profits. Hence, profit efficiency is not necessarily a relevant concept, 
and this paper focuses solely on cost efficiency. 
  Following Fries and Taci (2005), Kraft, Hofler and Payne (2006) and 
Sensarma (2006), inefficiencies in banks are estimated by applying the Battese – 
Coelli (1995) stochastic frontier estimation to a cost function. The logarithmic 
cost of the bank i period t is assumed to equal 
 
it it t it it U V ) p , x ( f ) c ( Ln + + =  (4.1) 
 
Where f is the so-called deterministic kernel, ie the costs of a fully efficient 
institution in absence of random factors, which is a function of the output vector 
xit and input price vector pt. Vit is a normally distributed random error with mean 
zero. Uit is undue costs caused by inefficiency. 
 
it it it W m U + =  (4.2) 
 
where Wit is a random variable, such that Uits are non-negative truncations of the 
distribution N (mit, σ




δ + δ =
N
1 j
j jit 0 it Z m  (4.3) 
 
where Zjit is the jth inefficiency determinant (Z variable) of the bank i year t and 
δs (delta coefficients) are parameters to be estimated. If mit ≥ 0, it is also the mode 
of the distribution. In the following, mit will loosely be called the mode, even 
though whenever mit is negative it does not even belong to the support of Uit. 
  Possible differences in input prices between regions can be taken into account 
in the deterministic kernel by introducing geographic effects as simple dummy 
variables, as interactions with outputs, and as interactions with relative input 
prices. (See Appendix 1) Any regional factors other than differences in input 
prices probably affect the coefficients of the geographic dummy variables, which 
should not be a problem.  
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  The cost function is the standard translog specification complemented with 
trigonometric terms. The importance of trigonometric terms is stressed by eg 
Huang and Wang (2004), Humphrey and Vale (2004) and Kraft, Hofler and Payne 
(2006). Following numerous contributions,
6 Fourier terms are applied only for 
outputs. Following Berger and Mester (1997) and Kraft, Hofler and Payne (2006), 
linear homogeneity in input prices is imposed on the cost function by dividing 
both costs and other factor prices by one factor price, which in this case is the 















+ + + + γ + + + ζ +
+ + Γ + + η + ξ + Ω +
+ φ + μ + ς +
+ α + Λ + ϖ + ϖ + Ψ +
+ θ + θ +
























































2 1 0 3 i i 0 2
V U ) Y Y Y ( Cos ) Y Y Y ( Sin
) Y Y ( Cos ) Y Y ( Sin ) Y ( Cos ) Y ( Sin
) p / p ( Ln G ) p / Q ( Ln G G
) p / p ( TLn ) p / Q ( TLn T T ) p / Q ( Ln ) p / Q ( Ln
) p / p ( Ln ) p / p ( Ln ) p / Q ( Ln
) p / p ( Ln ) p / Q ( Ln ) p / C ( Ln
 (4.4) 
 
The first four lines include all the terms of the translog cost function. The last two 
rows include the trigonometric add-on terms. C is the administrative expenses of 
the bank during the year in question, p1 is the labour cost index of the financial 
services sector, p2 is the GDP deflator of services to the business sector, p3 is the 
wholesale price index, Qs are the four outputs, T is the trend, Yi is the real, non-
logarithmic output i (Qi/p3) scaled between 0.1Π and 1.9Π,
7 Gi is the geographic 
dummy variable i , U is the inefficiency term, V is the normally distributed error 
and all the Greek letters are parameters to be estimated. The variables C, Q and Y 
are both bank and year specific whereas the variables p1, p2, p3 and T are year 
specific but common to all banks. 
                                                 
6 Altunbas, Evans and Molyneux (2001), Girardone, Molyneux and Gardener (2004), Carbo, 
Gardener and Williams (2002) and Williams and Nguyen (2005). 
7 For each observation Yi = 1.8Π [(Qi/p3)-Min(Qi/p3)]/[Max(Qi/p3)-Min(Qi/p3)]+0.1Π, where Yi is 
the scaled output item i, Qi is the original, nominal output, Min(Qi/p3) is the lowest value of real 
output Qi/p3 in the whole sample of 1854 observations, Max (Qi/p3) the largest real output and Π ≈ 
3.14159… Similar transformations have been used in bank efficiency estimations by eg Carbo, 
Gardener and Williams (2002), Altunbas, Evans and Molyneux (2001), Williams and Nguyen 
(2005), Girardone, Molyneux and Gardener (2004), Berger and Mester (1997) and Kraft, Hofler 
and Payne (2006). The endpoints close to 0 and 2Π are normally excluded to avoid the problems 
discussed by Gallant (1981).  
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  Efficiency is determined as a function of several variables, most of them 
being related to the managing director. Both the signalling theory and the human 
capital theory predict that education should improve efficiency. It is possible that 
experience, proxied by age, and education are either complements or substitutes. 
Preferable manager characteristics may depend on the size of the bank. Therefore, 
a large number of interaction effects are allowed to affect efficiency. 
  The age of the managing director is measured as the difference between the 
current year and the year of birth. At least according to stereotypic beliefs, people 
may become less energetic and slower to adopt new ideas when they grow older. 
An education acquired decades ago may be obsolete. On the other hand, mature 
age persons have accumulated substantial amounts of work and life experience, 
which may help them to avoid misjudgements. Because the impact of age on 
performance may be non-linear, the squared value of age is used in addition to the 
age itself. 
  The most comprehensive specification is the following. 
 
mit = δ0 + δ1 Group1 + δ2 Group2 + δ3Age + δ4Age
2 + δ5UAgSil + δ6UBusEcon 
+ δ7ULaw + δ8Uother + δ9VocBA + δ10Other + δ11LnTier1*UAgSil + 
δ12LnTier1*UBusEcon + δ13LnTier1*ULaw + δ14LnTier1*Uother + 
δ15LnTier1*VocBA + δ16LnTier1*Other + δ17LnTier1*Age + δ18Age*UAgSil + 
δ19Age*UBusEcon + δ20Age*ULaw + δ21Age*UOther + δ22Age*VocBA + 
δ23Age*Other + δ24LnTier1 + δ25 Less2y + δ26 Less5y + δ27Over15y (4.5) 
 
LnTier1 is the logarithmic real tier 1 capital, which is an indicator of bank size. 
Unlike in many other contributions, loan losses and non-performing loans are 
ignored. Credit risk may be a major factor in banking, but during the sample 
period loan losses of all the sample banks were negligible, and they declined from 
0.1% of claims on customers in 1999 to almost zero in 2004. 
  The estimation is based on the assumption that observable manager 
characteristics affect efficiency, not vice versa. The mechanisms behind possible 
correlations between costs, Z variables of the data and unobserved factors may be 
more complicated. This issue will be discussed further in conclusions. In the light 




5.1 Different  specifications  and inefficiency determinants 
Various model specifications were estimated with the Battese-Coelli (1995) 
method. Some basic statistics on the results are presented in table 5.1. Model 0  
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has the full deterministic kernel but no manager specific variables as efficiency 
determinants. In statistical terms, the performance is weak relative to models 1–2 
and 4–7, but efficiency estimates derived without manager specific information 
are needed in section 5.2. 
  The full-scale model 1 includes all the potential variables of the deterministic 
kernel and all the efficiency determinants of equation (4.5). It was systematically 
tested which blocks of variables could be dropped off without significant loss of 
explanatory power. In the light of the lambda values reported in table 5.1, no other 
variables than the manager tenure length dummies can be excluded; this 
specification is numbered 2. The insignificance of tenure length is corroborated by 
the low asymptotic t-values of tenure length delta coefficients of model 1 reported 
in table 5.2. The high lambda coefficients of models 4–7 in table 5.1 imply that 
other blocks of Z variables have statistically significant explanatory power. Even 
the model 4 is rejected at the 5% level if the lambda value is calculated against the 
model 2. The high lambda value of model 3 implies that there is statistically 
significant evidence on the importance of interactions between geographic effects 
and other cost determinants. Hence, on statistical grounds the model 2 can be used 
as the main model. 
  There are differences in the cost efficiency of different banking groups. The 
reference group is more efficient than the first group. If one re-runs the model 2 
and denotes the first and the third groups with dummy variables, the positive 
coefficient of the first group dummy is significant at the 5% level; the first group 
is statistically significantly less efficient than the second group. 
  As expected, manager age affects efficiency in a non-linear way. Among the 
youngest efficiency improves as a function of age but among the oldest the 
opposite is true. If one ignores the relatively large standard errors and accepts the 
delta coefficients of model 2 as such, efficiency is predicted to reach its optimum 
at the age of 46 and to deteriorate thereafter, when education is unknown and the 
manager is running a bank of median size. The optimal age varies between 30 and 
57, depending on education. Small banks are more likely to suffer from cost 




Table 5.1  Models estimated with the full sample of 309 banks 
      and 6 years of data using the Battese-Coelli (1995) 
     method 
 
Lambda = -2 [LLF (Model to be tested) – LLF (Model 1)]; the probability values of the 





2 is the 
variance of the normal distribution on which the truncated distribution of W is based on; 
σ
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All the manager specific 
inefficiency 
determinants 
3 155 7.3 % 1 534.6 103.16 0.000 0.29 32.7 0.000
1
Full scale model - 
nothing excluded




24 155 10.4 % 1 585.8 0.80 0.850 0.33 135.0 0.000
3
Tenure length dummies, 
interactions of 
geographic dummy 
variables in the kernel
24 105 10.8 % 1 466.5 239.41 0.000 0.08 208.1 0.000
4
Tenure length dummies 
and Ln(Tier 1)
23 155 9.1 % 1 582.9 6.63 0.157 0.32 129.1 0.000
5
Tenure length dummies 
and interactions 
between manager 
education and Tier 1 
capital
18 155 4.1 % 1 569.3 33.77 0.000 0.09 102.0 0.000
6
Tenure lenth dummies 
and interactions 
between manager age 
and education 
18 155 3.8 % 1 540.6 91.21 0.000 0.005 44.5 0.001
7
 Manager age, manager 
age squared and tenure 
length dummies




Interestingly, the impact of education on performance is very complicated and not 
always easy to understand. As the high lambda values of models 5 and 6 indicate, 
the interactions of education with bank size and manager age are highly 
significant. Because understanding the impact of different educational variables 
on efficiency is rather difficult in the presence of all the interaction effects of  
19 
model 2, a few illustrative examples are presented in table 5.3. The example 
values of bank size and manager age refer to the 10
th, 50
th and 90
th percentiles of 
sample distributions. In the case of a median size bank, the manager should 
preferably have a university degree in business administration or in fields 
classified as ‘other’. A non-university degree in business administration can also 
be a good educational background, especially in the smallest banks of the sample. 
A degree in jurisprudence does not predict good performance in cost 
minimisation, except among the youngest. As a rule, university graduates have a 
comparative advantage in managing large banks, which is intuitive. 
  Differences between different types of managers are not negligible. For 
instance, in the case of a median size bank, the difference between the lowest and 
the highest mode is 0.17. In the whole sample, the standard deviation of model 2 
modes is only 0.11. 
  There is at least one obvious pattern in the manager specific components of 
efficiency modes. Educational background matters among the oldest, but among 
the youngest it seems to be of limited relevance. If managers are running median 
size banks, the difference between the highest and lowest efficiency mode 
estimate in table 5.4 is 0.07 at the age of 39. At the age of 58, it is 0.17. This result 
is rather difficult to interpret; neither the human capital theory, nor the signalling 




Table 5.2  Delta coefficients of models 0, 1, 2, 4 and 7; 
      asymptotic t values in parentheses  
 
Model 0 Model 1 Model 2 Model 4 Model 7
Constant 0.15 0,57 0,58 0,20 0,11
(2.9) (3.1) (3.0) (0.6) (5.3)
Group1 0,066 0,080 0,079 0,070 0,070
(4.3) (5.2) (4.9) (2.9) (3.3)
Group2 0,024 0,038 0,037 0,040 0,034
(1.8) (2.0) (1.9) (0.9) (1.3)
Age -0,018 -0,018 -0,010
(-2.3) (-2.3) (-0.5)
Age
2 1,8E-04 1,9E-04 9.24E-05
(2.4) (2.3) (0.6)
UAgSil -0,18 -0,18 -0,36 -0,19
(-1.4) (-1.2) (-1.5) (-1.1)
UBusEcon 0,069 0,067 0.081 0,147
(0.6) (0.5) (0.3) (1.1)
ULAw -0,22 -0,21 -0,34 -0,20
(-2.2) (-1.9) (-1.8) (-1.4)
Uother 0,31 0,30 0,50 0,39
(2.3) (2.1) (2.2) (2.3)
VocBA 0,17 0,18 0,58 0,19
(2.3) (2.2) (4.1) (1.7)
Other 0,15 0,15 0,26 0,16
(1.6) (1.4) (1.3) (1.2)
Ln(Tier1)*UAgSil -0,10 -0,10 -0,14 -0,09
(-3.4) (-3.0) (-3.4) (-3)
Ln(Tier1)*UBusEcon -0,068 -0,069 -0.136 -0,067
(-2.4) (-2.2) (-2.7) (-2.2)
Ln(Tier1)*ULaw -0,051 -0,051 -0.111 -0,053
(-2.5) (-2.1) (-3.4) (-2)
Ln(Tier1)*UOther -0,141 -0,146 -0.149 -0,142
(-1.9) (-1.8) (-3.5) (-2.9)
Ln(Tier1)*VocBA -0,012 -0,015 -0.082 0,023
(-0.8) (-0.8) (-3.9) (1.4)
Ln(Tier1)*Other -0,043 -0,044 -0.073 -0,039
(-2.2) (-1.9) (-1.7) (-1.3)
Ln(Tier1)*Age 0,001 0,001 -0.001 0,001
(0.7) (0.6) (-2.7) (0.8)
Age*UAgSil 0,006 0,006 0.010 0,006
(2.0) (1.7) (2.0) (1.5)
Age*UBusEcon -0,001 -0,001 -0.001 -0,003
(-0.4) (-0.3) (-0.2) (-0.9)
Age*ULaw 0,006 0,006 0.009 0,005
(2.7) (2.3) (2.2) (1.7)
Age*Uother -0,005 -0,004 -0.009 -0,007
(-1.6) (-1.4) (-1.5) (-1.6)
Age*VocBA -0,004 -0,004 -0.013 -0,005
(-2.7) (-2.5) (-4.3) (-2.1)
Age*Other -0,003 -0,003 -0.005 -0,003
(-1.5) (-1.4) (-1.4) (-1.2)
Ln(Tier1) -0.003 -0,090 -0,087 -0,066






   (0.8)   
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Table 5.3  Examples of the mode of inefficiency distributions 
     (mit) as a function of managing director age and 
     education,  with  different values of tier 1 capital of 
     the  bank 
 
Figures based on model 2 delta coefficients; all the direct and interaction effects of 
education, age and bank size taken into account. Nominal tier 1 capital must be divided 
by the wholesale price index (2004: 1711) before entering it into the equation implied by 
model 2; Group1=Group2=0 in all the examples 
 
Tier1 = 5227 Tier1 = 5227 Tier1=5227 Tier1 = 1735 Tier1 = 18172
Age = 50 Age = 39 Age = 58 Age = 50 Age = 50
UAgSilv 0.08 0.02 0.15 0.26 -0.12
UBusEcon 0.02 0.04 0.04 0.17 -0.14
ULaw 0.09 0.04 0.16 0.22 -0.04
UOther 0.00 0.05 -0.01 0.23 -0.26
VocBA 0.03 0.08 0.02 0.11 -0.06
Other 0.04 0.08 0.05 0.16 -0.09
Missing 0.08 0.09 0.11 0.15 0.01  
 
 
5.2  Managers and efficiency changes 
The high lambda value of model 0 in table 5.1 implies that manager 
characteristics predict efficiency. It has been assumed that this is not due to the 
tendency of certain types of banks to recruit certain types of managers. Instead, 
the results were interpreted as causalities running from manager characteristics to 
efficiency. If this is the correct interpretation, manager changes should be 
followed by above average efficiency changes. The 110 banks with at least two 
different managing directors between January 1999 and December 2004 were 
selected for further analysis. 
  If two banks have same costs and identical outputs, the Battese-Coelli method 
may assign them different efficiency estimates. If a bank has efficiency 
determinants typical for inefficient institutions, the cost function residual is 
interpreted as inefficiency (Uit) rather than mere random noise (Vit). When 
analysing how manager changes cause changes in efficiency, efficiency estimates 
should not be derived from manager specific information. Therefore, estimates 
based on model 0 were used. The explained variable could be the absolute value 
of the difference of inefficiency. This variable measures change irrespective of its 
direction. The distribution of this variable is skewed because most of the changes 
are close to zero, and a few extreme observations account for most of the 
variance, as can be seen in column 2 of table 5.4. But, as can be seen in column 3, 
the logarithm of this variable is much more evenly distributed. Moreover, because 
the non-logarithmic variable cannot be negative even though most observations 
are close to zero, and because panel estimations with truncated explained  
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variables pose problems (see eg Baltagi 2001, 212–214), the analysis is facilitated 
if the explained variable is made non-truncated by the logarithmic transformation.  
 
Table 5.4  Distributional data on estimated efficiency changes 
 
Sub sample of 110 banks; 2000–2004; N=550 
 
1 2 3
Ln(Uit/U it-1) Abs(Uit - U it-1) Ln[Abs(Uit - U it-1)]
Min -1.67 0.00003 -10.27
25 percentile -0.16 0.004 -5.42
Median -0.04 0.010 -4.65
Average -0.04 0.016 -4.77
75 percentile 0.08 0.020 -3.91
Maximum 1.81 0.109 -2.21
Skewness 0.03 2.15 -0.93  
 
 
This logarithmic efficiency change was regressed on the dummy variable 
NEWBOSS and the lagged value of efficiency, which was used as a control 
variable. NEWBOSS equals +1 if the managing director changed during the year, 
zero otherwise. As equation 1 of table 5.5 demonstrates, a new managing director 
affects efficiency already during the same year, and the impact continues during 
the following year. The statistical significance of cross-section fixed effects 
implies that there are relatively persistent differences in efficiency ‘volatility’. 
  Unfortunately the data does not tell the reason why a bank got a new 
managing director. However, if the old manager had reached a certain age, 
retirement is the most likely reason. The dummy variable RETIRED denotes cases 
where the exiting manager was at least 60 years old. The variable OTHERCH 
denotes manager changes in other cases, and it is calculated by subtracting 
RETIRED from NEWBOSS. There are 37 presumed retirements and 84 other 
manager changes. 
  Equation 2 in table 5.5 implies that the lagged impact on efficiency is stronger 
if the manager retires than if the former manager left for other reasons. If all the 
extreme cases where the explained variable is lesser than -8 are excluded, like in 
equation 5, the results are weaker but the evidence on the impact of manager 
changes on efficiency is still clear. A lagged manager change affects efficiency 
stronger than a non-lagged change. 
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Table 5.5  Panel estimation results; determinants of change of 
     efficiency 
 
Sub sample of 110 banks in equations 1–4; Wald test F stat for equal coefficients of 
RETRIREDt-1 and OTHERCHt-1 in eq 2 = 4.20**; 8 extreme observations with explained 




110 cross sections; 550 observations in equations 0-4




Constant -2.70 -2.70 -2.68 -2.65 -2.55 -2.89





OTHERCHt 0.26 0.26 0.14
(2.5)** (2.5)** (1.1)
OTHERCHt-1 0.34 0.33 0.23
(3.1)*** (3.1)*** (2.0)**
RETIREDt 0.27 0.25 0.24
(1.3) (1.2) (1.2)
RETIREDt-1 0.64 0.64 0.52
(3.2)*** (3.2)*** (3.4)***
Ln(Uit-1) 0.89 0.88 0.89 0.88 0.91 0.75
(8.5)*** (2.6)*** (2.6)*** (2.5)** (2.8)*** (1.8)*
LLF -865.06 -785.64 -784.96 -789.72 -788.41 -673.29
F-stat 21.14 2.22 2.18 2.13 2.16 2.63
R squared 0.16 0.37 0.37 0.36 0.37 0.43
White cross-section t statistics in parentheses
Statistical significance * = 10 % level; ** = 5 % level; ***= 1 % level
Redundant fixed effects in eq 1; Period effects F-test 2.9**, chi-




The same explanatory variables were used to explain the simple logarithmic 
difference of inefficiency. The high significance of cross-sectional fixed effects in 
equation 1 implies that there are bank-specific trends in levels, which may not be 
surprising. As can be seen in equation 1 in table 5.6, efficiency typically improves 
when a new managing director enters. The equations 2 and 4 demonstrate that if a  
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manager retires, cost efficiency improves. Equations 2 and 3 find no statistically 
significant regularity in case of other manager changes. Extreme cases where the 
absolute value of the difference between Uit and Uit-1 is greater than 0.05 were 
excluded in equation 5, leaving us 467 observations. The main conclusions remain 
unaffected. 
 
Table 5.6  Panel estimation results; determinants of the 
     logarithmic  difference  of model 0 inefficiency 
 
Extreme changes excluded in equation 5; banks with below median tier 1 capital year t 




Full sample 110 cross sections; 550 observations in equations 0-4
Fixed cross-section effects and period effects in equations 1-6
No fixed 
effects N=467 N=286
012 3 4 5 6
Constant -0.30 -2.20 -2.20 -2.21 -2.21 -1.53 -2.13





OTHERCHt 0.01 0.01 -0.02 0.06
(0.4) (0.4) (-1.4) (1.4)
OTHERCHt-1 -0.03 -0.03 -0.02 0.00
(-1.4) (-1.3) (-0.7) (0.1)
RETIREDt -0.07 -0.07 -0.08 -0.13
(-2.8)*** (-2.7)*** (-2.9)*** (-3.4)***
RETIREDt-1 -0.10 -0.09 -0.09 -0.09
(-3.9)*** (-3.8)*** (-3.0)*** (-4.3)***
Ln(Uit-1) -0.11 -0.87 -0.87 -0.87 -0.87 -0.59 -0.79
(-6.3)*** (-6.9)*** (-6.8)*** (-6.8)*** (-6.9)*** (-5.3)*** (-5.0)***
LLF 11.81 192.82 195.30 190.70 194.53 311.44 136.25
F-stat 12.73 3.98 3.96 3.92 4.03 2.24 2.91
R squared 0.07 0.52 0.52 0.51 0.52 0.43 0.52
White cross-section t statistics in parentheses
Statistical significance * = 10 % level; ** = 5 % level; ***= 1 % level
Redundant fixed effects in eq 1; Period effects F-test 10.1***, chi-squared 





Manager salary is included in bank costs. Is it possible that manager retirement 
improves cost efficiency because old managers are possibly paid higher wages 
than young ones? It has been argued that it is rational to pay senior employees 
more than what their productivity would justify because young employees are 
motivated by deferred compensation and hopes of growing old in the firm 
(Lazear, 1981). If such compensation practices are in place in sample banks, the 
cost savings due to manager retirement should be particularly strong in small 
banks where manager salary is probably a more important expenditure item in 
relative terms. An estimation was run with a sub-sample consisting of 
observations where the bank had a tier1 capital of more than EUR 5.4 million in 
2004 euros, which is the mean for this sub-sample in 1999–2004. The results are 
reported in the 6
th equation of table 5.6; contrary to expectations, if any difference 
exists, retirement enhances efficiency particularly strongly in the largest sample 
banks. 
  It is not obvious that manager changes can be treated as exogenous events. An 
endogeneity test was carried out analogously to the conventional Hausman test 
using the added variable approach. Instruments included manager tenure length 
dummies, manager age variables, group dummy variables and past level of 
inefficiency. There was no statistically significant evidence of manager change 
endogeneity problems, neither in table 5.5, nor in table 5.6. 
  The FSA data contains detailed information on the breakdown of costs. The 
six most extreme efficiency improvements that coincide with manager retirement 
were reviewed. In two cases efficiency improved because of strong growth in 
output. In three cases there was an overall decrease in nearly all kinds of costs. In 
one case the improvement may be an one-off phenomenon related to the 
retirement of the managing director; pension insurance expenditure was 




6  Conclusions and discussion 
This paper has presented some evidence on the impact of managers on cost 
efficiency. The sample consists of 1854 observations on 309 savings and 
cooperative banks in 1999–2004. Each observation is assigned an efficiency 
estimate by running Battese and Coelli (1995) stochastic frontier translog cost 
function estimations. Bank output is defined according to the production 
approach. 
  There is strong statistical evidence on the impact of age and education on 
performance in cost minimisation, but these effects seem to be rather complicated. 
In very small banks a vocational level qualification in business administration  
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seems to be the best education, in somewhat larger banks a university degree in 
business administration or economics is the best educational background. If an old 
manager retires, a significant cost efficiency improvement typically follows. 
Other manager changes also affect efficiency, but both improvements and 
deteriorations are equally possible. The optimal age of a managing director 
depends on the educational background. 
  The results were not obtained in controlled experiments. Underlying manager 
selection and self-selection processes have probably been very complicated. Most 
mature managers of the sample have been recruited by the industry decades ago. 
Banking groups’ recruitment policies and the attractiveness of the banking 
industry among young graduates may have varied, implying that if two persons 
are born different years but have the same education, they are not equally likely to 
have been employed by banks. Employees who have left cooperative and savings 
banks are probably no random draw either. Managers with vocational level 
qualifications in business administration may appear successful because the most 
skilled of them may have been promoted to management. Instead of being 
promoted, the best lawyers recruited by these banks may have been offered higher 
paying positions in major commercial banks. This hypothetical adverse selection 
would be able to create the impression that mature lawyers seldom make good 
managers. It is easy to present a very large number of these kinds of hypothetical 
selection effects. They may cause complicated statistical dependencies between 
age, education and various unobserved personality characteristics. 
  Some hypotheses of this kind can be tested, and some of the results may be 
worth brief reviewing. One might suggest that the sample has been partly selected 
by boards’ practice to lay off poor performers. If, for instance, university 
graduates are tolerated even if they perform poorly whereas inefficient managers 
without university degree are laid off, university graduates’ performance may 
appear poor. These kinds of hypotheses, however, are not corroborated by the 
data. In logit estimations with the full sample of 309 banks there seemed to be no 
evidence at all in favour of the hypothesis that lagged bank efficiency (in levels) 
would predict non-retirement manager changes. Interactions of efficiency and 
manager education seem to be equally irrelevant. (See Appendix 2) Managers 
may be laid off because of poor performance, and boards’ propensity to lay them 
off may correlate with observable manager characteristics, but best performers 
may leave equally systematically because of other reasons, making it impossible 
to detect the effect. As already mentioned, manager changes seemed to pass a 
simple endogeneity test in section 5.2. The results of a few failed experiments 
may be worth mentioning. In the sub-sample used in section 5.2, future manager 
changes did not explain efficiency changes in panel estimations, implying that the 
causality probably runs from manager changes to efficiency changes rather than in 
the opposite direction. Moreover, attempts to explain the age and education of 
entering new managers by past efficiency proved equally unsuccessful.  
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  In addition to differences in skills and efforts, we may have measured 
differences in objectives. Some managers may not try to minimise costs because 
they are unwilling to lay off loyal employees in high unemployment areas. Some 
managers may pursue social status by hiring as many subordinates as possible. It 
is difficult to test whether these kinds of phenomena are present in the sample. 
  Because hardly any research on the impact of bank manager characteristics on 
cost efficiency has been published, there are many open questions for further 
research. The data does not contain much explicit information on experience. 
Banking groups have internal training programmes, and their impact on efficiency 
could be estimated. Psychometric test results on cognitive skills and other 
personality characteristics might also be available, and they might have predictive 
power as efficiency determinants. Testing these kinds of effects would be 
relatively simple if suitable data were available.  
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Let us assume the price of the factor 1 in a given geographic area is g1 times the 
reference area price, and the price of the factor 2 is g2 times the reference area 
price. The relative prices in the equation to be estimated can be decomposed into 
reference area relative prices and a region specific effect captured by the simple 
dummy variable. 
 
βnLn {g1p1/(g2p2)} = βnLn (p1/p2) + βnLn(g1/g2) 
 
If relative input prices in the reference area differ from the national average 
reported in aggregate statistics, the coefficient βn captures this difference. The 
value of Ln(g1/g2) is unknown, but the coefficient of the geographic dummy 
variable adjusts accordingly. 
  As to the interaction between factor prices and outputs, the situation is 
relatively straightforward; the interactions of geographic factors and outputs must 
be included in the deterministic kernel. 
 
βm Ln (g1p1/g2p2) Ln (Qi) = βmLn (p1/p2) Ln (Qi) + βmLn(g1/g2) Ln (Qi) 
 
The logarithmic price squared can be decomposed into the squared logarithmic 
reference area relative price, the logarithmic reference area price and factors 
affecting the region specific dummy variable. 
 
βv [Ln (g1p/1g2p2)]
2 = βv [Ln(p1/p2) + Ln(g1/g2)]
2 =  
= βv [Ln(p1/p2)]
2 + 2βv Ln(p1/p2) +2 βv Ln(g1/g2) + βv [Ln(g1/g2)]
2 
 
The explained variable can also be decomposed. 
 
Ln[C/p2g2] = Ln [C/p2] – Ln(g2). 
 
The term Ln(g2) can be moved to the right side of the equal sign, and it  




Explained variable = 1 if OTHERCH equals 1 at
least once in 2000-2004.
N=309. In 69 cases explained variable = 1
12345
C -0,93 -1,27 -0,78 -1,87 -1,94
(-6.0) (-1.0) (-0.6) (-0.7) (-0.7)
Ui1999 1,40 1,73 0,85 1,64 4,45
(1.3) (1.1) (0.5) (0.5) (0.3)
LnTier1 0,04 -0,02 0,01 0,03
(0.3) (-0.1) (0.0) (0.1)
Group1 0,31 0,49 0,54
(1.3) (1.2) (1.3)






















Ui1999 * UnivEduc -3,33
(-0.8)




Mc Fadden R squared 0,01 0,01 0,01 0,04 0,02
LR Stat 1,66 1,72 3,68 13,71 5,46
Prob of LR stat 0,20 0,42 0,45 0,47 0,60
Statistically significant variables are not denoted by stars 
because not a single variable is statistically significant
at the 10 % level.
Gs are geographic dummy variables
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